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“Hinduism” and the Problem of 
Self-Actualisation in the Colonial 
Era: Critical Reflections
Amiya P. Sen
This paper is the text of a lecture delivered at the South Asia Institute, Hei-
delberg, on May 20, 2015, with footnotes added. It discusses how schol-
arly perceptions of colonial Hinduism have visibly shifted trajectory over 
the years. Relating how Hinduism has moved from being ‘discovered’ in the 
eighteenth century to be seen as discursively ‘invented’ or ‘imagined’ in 
the nineteenth, it argues that in colonial India, internally generated debates 
about the origin and nature of Hinduism paralleled ascriptions originating 
outside but failed to attract adequate attention. It also seeks to ask if not 
also to definitively answer certain key theoretical questions. For instance, 
even allowing for the fact that social and religious identities are always po-
rous, does it still make sense to ask if unstable and fluid perceptions of the 
self too were invested with some meaning?
I
His Excellency, M. Sevela Naik, Consul General of India at Munich; Prof. Ger-
rit Kloss, Dean, Philosophical Faculty; Prof. Stefan Klonner, Executive Direc-
tor, SAI; Professor Gita Dharampal Frick, Head, Department of History, SAI; 
Dr. Martin Gieselmann, Executive Secretary; SAI, Dr. Eleonore Schmitt, Li-
brarian, SAI; and other distinguished members of this audience. Thank you 
all for coming.
When speaking about religion in general and on Hinduism in particular, 
Heidelberg is undoubtedly a more encouraging and safer platform than 
those available back home. Within many influential streams of the Indian 
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academia, the choice of a subject such as this one, I fear, may well be dis-
missed as regressive or reactionary both in its orientation and content. It 
is only apt, therefore, that I use this occasion to express my anguish and 
concern at the fact that notwithstanding the richness and diversity of Indian 
religious culture, there are less than half a dozen institutions within India 
today which seriously engage with the academic study of religion. Sadly, 
some institutions appear to do so in the name of political correctness; they 
encourage the study of comparative religion only in as much as this lends 
strength to our ‘secular’ fabric. As an academic discipline in India, religion 
fares rather poorly; in many cases, it is the last refuge for students and 
scholars who have been unable to secure higher rated disciplines or more 
lucrative vocations. The case for “Hinduism” is particularly bad. Whereas 
even the University of Oxford in the U.K. hosts the Oxford Centre for Hindu 
Studies, there is no comparable institution worth the name in Hindu major-
ity India. 
In the presentation that I am about to make before you this evening I 
intend to put across essentially two points of criticism. First, I argue that 
claims that have been made about a pre-existing “Hinduism” being either 
discovered in the eighteenth century or else its being ‘imagined’ or ‘invent-
ed’ in the nineteenth, are both outsider perceptions and do not adequately 
take on board the question of just how the Hindus might have dealt with 
this question at given historical conjunctures. But even when looking for 
internally generated debates and differences, we often end up with a con-
fusion of heuristic categories. Particularly in the context of colonial India, it 
is commonplace to conflate intellectual representations of “Hinduism” with 
attempts to determine it in cultural or religious terms. This is a point well 
worth pondering since no religion or cultural system is exhausted by acts of 
cognition alone. It is my belief that what colonial India witnessed was not 
so much a debate on “Hinduism” itself as contesting Hindu hermeneutics. 
A closer look at this phenomenon such as I shall attempt in the course of 
this lecture, will reveal some muddled thinking, palpably on account of two 
reasons. In British India, representations of “Hinduism” originated in a new 
class of interpreters who adopted western categories of thought even when 
expressing themselves in the vernacular. Colonial “Hinduism” was rarely, if 
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ever, represented by traditional Hindu scholars and exegetes, who might 
have preferred to communicate through purely indigenous idioms of self-
expression. On the contrary, there are known instances of traditional Hindu 
scholars and missionaries quite speciously attempting to rationalise older 
Hindu thought and praxis by using the language of modern science and only 
ending up in acutely embarrassing their Anglophone compatriots. Such was 
the power of ‘English language Hinduism’. Second, it would be important to 
remember that to an extent, muddled thinking also arose in the fact that 
acts of interpretation or re-interpretation aimed not so much at self-un-
derstanding as presenting apologetic projections of the Hindu self before 
non-Hindus.
I begin with the observation that the terms “Hindu” and “Hinduism” or-
dinarily function more as a noun than an adjective.1 It is far easier to de-
fine the Christian ‘calling’ or the Islamic ‘path’ than the Hindu ‘way of life’ 
that eminent Hindu thinkers and scholars like Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan or 
Chakravarti Rajagopalachari have tried to formulate. To a student or schol-
ar researching “Hinduism” it would be also quite evident that over time, 
academic views on the subject, if not also general public opinion, has un-
dergone a palpable paradigm shift. Broadly speaking, this rests on three 
inter-related and acutely revisionist critiques. First, there is the problem 
of origin or the historically determined age for “Hinduism”. In 1970, Peter 
J. Marshall had reason to believe that British travellers, missionaries and 
colonial administrators had come to ‘discover’ Hinduism in the eighteenth 
century; closer to our time, Geoffrey A. Oddie has argued that in truth, this 
had been only ‘imagined’ by the same classes of people in the nineteenth.2 
1 An observation also made by Rajmohan Gandhi in his review of Srinivasan, Vasanthi 
(2014): Hindu Spirituality and Virtue Politics; Los Angeles, SAGE Publications. Cf. Gandhi, 
Rajmohan (2015), The Book Review (New Delhi), 31.4, 4.
2 Peter J. Marshall (ed.) (1970): The British Discovery of Hinduism in the Eighteenth 
Century; Cambridge, Cambridge University Press; Oddie, Geoffrey A. (2006): Imagined 
Hinduism. British Missionary Constructions of Hinduism, 1793‒1900; New Delhi, SAGE 
Publications. The argument of Hinduism being ‘invented’ typically occurs in Heinrich von 
Stietencron (1989): ‘Hinduism. On the proper use of a deceptive term’; in: Sontheimer, 
Günther Dietz & Hermann Kulke (eds.): Hinduism Reconsidered; New Delhi, Manohar; 
Dalmia, Vasudha & Heinrich von Stietencron (eds.) (1995): Representing Hinduism. The 
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Arguments similar to the one made by Oddie have often been coupled with 
the claim that the cultural and religious formation commonly called “Hindu-
ism” did not exist in nature or originate in the historical and cultural experi-
ence of the Hindus themselves. On the contrary, this is seen as a synthetic 
category born of contrivance, ‘an orchid bred by European scholarship’ as 
one scholar has chosen to call it.3 Third, existing alongside such critiques are 
mounting doubts expressed about whether or not “Hinduism” at all fits the 
conceptual category of ‘religion’.4 W.C. Smith’s observation, made some five 
decades back about “Hinduism” being a ‘particularly false conceptualisa-
tion’, has only gained in strength in thoughts articulated since that time.5
Currently, the reigning discourse on this question is that rather than the 
timeless and continuous religious tradition that it was believed to be not so 
long ago, “Hinduism” may justly be proclaimed as the youngest of ‘world-re-
ligions’. At times, this is joined to the claim that effectively, the Hindu can do 
without any discernible religious convictions. “The chief concern of Hindu 
religious conviction is not the existence or non-existence of God or whether 
there is one God or many gods”, a scholar writes, “Hindus can choose to be 
monotheists, polytheists, pantheists, atheists, agnostics, dualists, monists 
or pluralists”.6 J.A.B. van Buitenen, writing for the Encyclopaedia Britannica, 
has even gone to the extent of claiming that “[…] a Hindu may embrace a 
non-Hindu religion without ceasing to be a Hindu”. In effect, this creates 
the extraordinary possibility of a Hindu not having to be a Hindu in order to 
be a Hindu!7 Such perceptions stand in visible contrast to the view, hitherto 
Construction of Religious Traditions and National Identity; London, SAGE Publications.
3 Küng, Hans & Heinrich von Stietencron (2005): Christentum und Weltrereligionen II: 
Hinduismus; München, Piper; cited in Llewellyn, J.E. (ed.) (2005): Defining Hinduism. A 
Reader; London, Equinox; p. 11.
4 Fitzgerald, Timothy (2005): ‘Problems with “Religion” as a Category for Understand-
ing Religion’; in: Llewellyn, Defining Hinduism, 171‒201.
5 Smith, Wilfred Cantwell (1963): The Meaning and End of Religion. A Revolutionary 
Approach to the Great Religious Traditions; New York, Macmillan.
6 Nigosian, Solomon A. (2000): World Religions. An Historical Approach; Boston, Bed-
ford/St. Martin’s; p. 20; cited in Llewellyn, Defining Hinduism, p. 4.
7 van Buitenen, J.A.B. (1974): “Hinduism”; in The New Encyclopaedia Britannica, vol. 
5; Chicago, Encyclopaedia Britannica, 519‒58; p. 519; quoted in Brian K. Smith: “Ques-
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commonly accepted, that although not a creedal religion like Christianity, 
“Hinduism” has long been invested with a doctrinal core, deviation from 
which would amount to ceasing, at least in an intellectual sense, to be a 
Hindu.8 Further, to argue that “Hinduism” has had no natural state of exist-
ence implicitly leads to the highly dubious claim that other religions like 
Christianity or Islam were naturally born and not determined by historical 
or cultural changes.
The difficulties in defining “Hinduism” also spring from the fact that at 
no point of time were the several definitions offered applicable to all Hin-
dus even though things were often made to look that way. It is quite un-
likely that within the “Hindu” tradition, conformity rested on ‘intellectual’ 
grounds alone across the community of people that might have called them-
selves “Hindu”. Intellectual and textual accounts of “Hinduism” have not 
always documented lived religion and conversely, what is often deemed to 
be ‘religious’ in the everyday life of the Hindu, has not always found a place 
in textual studies on “Hinduism”. I take it, therefore, that particularly in the 
context of colonial India, the characteristic qualities attached to “Hinduism”, 
whether in a positive sense or the exasperatingly negative, originates not 
so much in the commonplace, pedestrian Hindu but members of the mod-
ern, Anglophone Hindu intelligentsia who have been actively engaged with 
heuristic problems of meaning or definition for over two centuries now. The 
latter are better understood as interpreters of “Hinduism” than its active 
practitioners; closer to the cultural construct of ‘religion’ than to matters 
of active faith. Such people did not habitually visit holy shrines and tem-
ples nor did they reveal any palpable interest in the ritual acts governing 
the daily life of the Hindu. They had practically very little knowledge or un-
derstanding of Vedic literature even when identifying that with the Hindu 
canon and lacked a working knowledge of the Sanskrit language which they 
otherwise saw as constituting both an inner unity of Hindu thought and the 
tioning Authority: Construction and Deconstruction of Hinduism”; in: Llewellyn, Defining 
Hinduism, p. 109.
8 Young, Richard Fox (1981): Resistant Hinduism. Sanskrit Sources on Anti-Christian 
Apologetics in Early Nineteenth Century India; Vienna, De Nobili Research Institute; p. 
140.
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pan-Indian spread of Hindu religious culture. Finally, even as interpreters 
of their tradition, the modern Hindu intelligentsia was deeply divided. In 
nineteenth century India, when critical questions about what it meant to be 
a Hindu arose with some regularity, there also appeared deep differences 
over questions of authority, authenticity and canon. Consider for example, 
the question of Vedas as the accepted canon for Hindus. Among modern 
Hindu reformers both Rammohan Roy (1772‒1833) and Swami Dayanand 
Saraswati (1824‒83) speak consistently of the Vedas, but their understand-
ing and acceptance of these texts were very differently located. Rammohan 
Roy treated the Upaniṣads synonymously with the Vedas and had virtually 
no knowledge of the Saṃhitās which Dayanand, to offer a striking contrast, 
took as representing the core of Vedic wisdom. The spiritual successors of 
Rammohan Roy quite radically rejected the Vedas as pramāṇa (authority) 
and put together a religious source-book, which, contrary to past practice, 
was culled from both śruti and smr̥ti.9 And whereas the Brahmos persis-
tently displayed a broad cosmopolitanism and interest in non-Indic religious 
cultures, Dayanand’s Satyārth Prakāś was notoriously intolerant of these. It 
occurs to me, therefore, that even when re-interpreting or re-orienting the 
“Hindu” tradition, it was not easy for the modern Hindu intelligentsia to de-
termine the exact nexus between values and structure, between idealistic 
visions and historical contingencies. Hence, it still remains a moot question 
as to whether the social and religious reforms initiated by this class made 
way for a ‘unified Hinduism’ or such reform itself postulated a unified reli-
gious system for the Hindus. 
In this paper, I proceed with the assumption that though elusive and dif-
ficult to pin down as a definitional category, there did exist in pre-colonial 
India, a certain cognitive view of the world or of life within it that may be 
called “Hindu”. That being said, one needs to be careful about leap-frog-
ging across historical time by locating a continuum between medieval In-
dian doxography that brought together various Hindu philosophical schools 
9 I am referring here to the two-volume Brāhmodharmagrantha (1849) of Deven-
dranath Tagore, which, quite uniquely, incorporated theological and philosophical ideas 
from the Upaniṣads, sm̥rti texts and tantra. Republished (n.y.) Kolkata, SBS Publications.
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and the rhetoric of a unified “Hinduism” born in colonial India. “In unifying 
the āstika philosophical schools”, Andrew Nicholson writes in his Unifying 
Hinduism, “Vijñānabhikṣu and his contemporaries made possible the world 
religion later known by the name Hinduism”.10 Such formulations can be 
problematic. For one, within colonial “Hinduism”, the intellectual founda-
tions of Hindu ‘unity’ lay not in any acclaimed philosophical coherence but 
apparently its very opposite—the hierarchized privileging of some philo-
sophical schools over others. From Rammohan Roy down to Radhakrishnan, 
there has been a pronounced tendency to treat non-dualist Vedanta (ad-
vaita vedānta) alone as quintessential Indian thought. This, in itself, poses a 
problem yet unresolved in contemporary scholarship.11 Second, it would be 
reasonable to say that in colonial India as contrasted with the pre-colonial, 
the Hindu mind was faced with a palpably different order of challenges. 
Nineteenth century Hindu press and literature is replete with references 
to how Islam and the Muslims, when compared to the Christian (and mod-
ern) West, failed to throw an active moral and intellectual challenge to the 
Hindus.  The nature of the Hindu-Muslim dialogue in pre-modern India, it is 
important to remember, was intrinsically religious, a fact that proved critical 
since religions, by themselves, have been known to be the most resistant 
to change.12 Barring few exceptions, the Indo-Muslim ruling class produced 
no active or systematized critique of contemporary Hindu theology or of 
the jāti system. The colonized Hindu, by comparison, was confronted with 
a two-pronged assault that deftly combined a theological contempt for the 
heathen with secular-scientific critiques of traditional Indian society and 
culture. Rev. Alexander Duff (1806‒78), notwithstanding his success with 
securing converts in early nineteenth century Bengal (some of whom were 
10 Nicholson, Andrew J. (2011): Unifying Hinduism. Philosophy and Identity in Indian 
Intellectual History; New Delhi, Permanent Black; p. 6.
11 See for instance Daya Krishna’s treatment of this subject in Krishna, Daya (2002): De-
velopments in Indian Philosophy from Eighteenth Century onwards. Classical and West-
ern; Delhi, Motilal Banarsidas; p. 40; Appendix I, pp. 345‒61.
12 See Sen, Amiya P. (2007): ‘The Idea of Social Reform and its Critique among Hindus 
of Nineteenth Century India’; in: Bhattacharya, Sabyasachi (ed.): Development of Mod-
ern Indian Thought and the Social Sciences; New Delhi, Oxford University Press/Centre 
of Studies in Civilizations; p. 115.
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Brahmins) believed that the philosophical and the scientific discourse of the 
contemporary West would more effectively shake the foundations of Hindu 
society than the acknowledged moral and theological superiority of Chris-
tianity.13 In post-Enlightenment Europe itself, there was a discernible ten-
dency to gloss over the differences hitherto separating the scientific spirit 
from the evangelist. The successors of Locke and Newton did come to be-
lieve that disseminating modern, secular education was no less God’s work 
than propagating the ‘truths’ of the Gospel. Even allowing for Nicholson’s 
argument that the synthetic forging of Hindu philosophical unity, chiefly by 
the Vedantins, had peaked by the sixteenth century,14 there still remains 
the historical time separating this period from early colonial India, the in-
tellectual contours of which are not as definitively known. Advaita Vedanta 
itself, to cite an apt example, does not appear to have enjoyed the exalted 
intellectual standing between the sixteenth and eighteen centuries that it 
increasingly gained after Raja Rammohan Roy.15 In early nineteenth century 
Bengal, where the first forays into ‘reformed’ religion were made, the local 
intelligentsia came to reveal a startling ignorance of śruti literature, hitherto 
accepted as canonical. Around 1815, when Rammohan Roy started translat-
ing and commenting upon select Upanishads, his orthodox adversaries ac-
cused him of dealing with texts that were forgeries.16 Rammohan Roy’s crit-
ics, however, met with deep embarrassment when told that the Raja’s most 
worthy opponent, Pandit Mritunjay Vidyalankar (1762‒1811) possessed a 
personal library that housed the best local collection of śruti manuscripts.17 
This leads me to believe that the failure of the Hindu intelligentsia to more 
actively locate greater doctrinal coherence in their tradition points to a 
qualitative decline in contemporary Hindu scholarship. In his seminal essay, 
13 Cited in Basu, Shamita (2002): Religious Revivalism as Nationalist Discourse. Swami 
Vivekananda and New Hinduism in Nineteenth Century Bengal; New Delhi, Oxford Uni-
versity Press; p. 46.
14 Nicholson, Unifying Hinduism, pp. 1‒23.
15 See note 12 above.
16 Robertson, Bruce Carlisle (1995): Raja Rammohan Ray. The Father of Modern India; 
New Delhi, Oxford University Press; pp. 1‒9.
17 Ibid.
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‘The Renaissance of India’, Sri Aurobindo (1872‒1950) makes the point that 
the West might have caught the Indian mind when it was intellectually at its 
weakest.18
Over time, I have also come to entertain the feeling that the substance 
and strength of Hindu orthopraxy has been somewhat overstretched. Such 
a view is possible even when allowing for the fact that in the Hindu tradi-
tion, the mechanisms of control are more structural than doctrinal. Con-
temporary India amply demonstrates that “Hinduism” has survived the vis-
ible weakening of caste structures in everyday life and this is visible even in 
those politicized Hindu groups or communities that openly adhere to the 
idea of a unified Hinduism. Perhaps the problem also lies elsewhere. Quite 
often, the academic study of religion arrogates to itself the right or author-
ity to decide the boundaries of a religious community or what constitutes 
‘orthodoxy’. I am persuaded to raise this especially to counter the view that 
‘religions’ have virtually no existence outside the academia.19 Now, in the 
context of “Hinduism”, it would be one thing to question the ‘superiority’ 
that the Brahmins assign to themselves within the Hindu social and religious 
order and quite another to deny them the right or authority to create a 
doctrinal cover under which smaller and even mutually contesting religious 
particularisms may grow and flourish. If, therefore, there can be no one way 
of defining the “Hindu”, this would at least partly appear to follow from the 
possibility that the term ‘religion’ itself may be differently conceptualized in 
various traditions. In the 1880s, when the noted Hindu-Bengali novelist and 
thinker, Bankim Chandra Chattopadhayay (1838‒94) attempted to reduce 
the singularly complex term dharma to the category of a normative ‘reli-
gion’, he was in effect trying to foist an axiomatic moral and philosophical 
Truth upon a complex variety of social and cultural praxis.20 Bankim Chandra 
18 Sri Aurobindo (1951): The Renaissance in India; Pondicherry, Sri Aurobindo Asram; 
p. 25. The work was originally serialized in the journal Arya between August and Novem-
ber, 1918.
19 Jonathan Smith, quoted in Smith, Questioning Authority, p. 120.
20 See his Dharmmatattva (1888). This work is available in an English translation, cf. 
Ray, Apratim (2003): Bankimchandra Chattopadhyay’s Dharmatattva, with an introduc-
tion by Amiya P. Sen; New Delhi, Oxford University Press. The original Bengali text is 
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was just as aware as any of us that in the Hindu tradition, the term dharma 
carried a multiplicity of meanings, ranging from the social and pragmatic 
to the cosmic and transcendental and yet, as I have argued elsewhere, for 
him the pursuit of dharma also underscored no less an arduous spiritual 
apprenticeship (sādhanā) as the awakening of modern notions of civic re-
sponsibility.21 Bankim Chandra, incidentally, also anticipates contemporary 
scholarship in arguing that “Hinduism” was not one but several religions22. 
And yet, he also believed that a unified view of religion was possible within 
his tradition, provided that unity was not taken to be an absolute identity 
but close-knit affiliations and family resemblances. Perhaps it is in allow-
ing this interplay of thought and structure and not their mutual exclusion 
that we may better understand how within the Hindu tradition, centering 
co-exists with de-centering, centripetal forces with the centrifugal, in a deli-
cate balancing act that has demonstrably stood the test of time. This also 
enables us to understand “Hinduism” as a social and cultural category that 
combines the plasticity of orthopraxy with the fixity of certain given values. 
‘Truth’ in the Hindu world-view is not necessarily doctrinal truth and it is 
equally the case that “Hinduism” does not judge other religions through 
the categories of ‘truth’ and ‘falsehood’.23 On the contrary, what fortifies 
this world-view is the transcendental nature of Truth, never fully cognis-
able to the limited human mind. Individual experiences draw meaning from 
this larger and trans-worldly Truth. Hindu orthopraxy, when taken outside 
this synoptic model, represents only bewildering epistemic infirmity with 
no foundations in validating thought or practice. A purely relative theory of 
values, after all, cannot really be a theory of values.
It was in the nineteenth century more than ever before that the colonized 
available in J.C. Bāgal (ed.) (1990): Baṅkim Racanābalī (Collected Works of Bankimchan-
dra Chattopadhyaya), vol. 2; Kalikātā, Sāhitya Saṃsad, 584‒679.
21 Sen Amiya P. (2010): Explorations in Modern Bengal. C. 1800‒1900. Essays on Reli-
gion, History and Culture; Delhi, Primus Books; p. 154.
22 Sen, Amiya P. (2011): ‘Introduction’; in: Sen, Amiya P. (ed.): Bankim’s Hinduism. An 
Anthology of Writings by Bankim Chandra Chattopadhyay; Delhi, Permanent Black, 3‒41.
23 Balgangadhara, S.N. (2012): Reconceptualizing India Studies; Delhi, Oxford Univer-
sity Press; pp. 205‒6.
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Hindu came to realize how the use of ‘Hindu’ as a term of self-description 
amounted to an alienation of the self since such use had origins in a culture 
that was non-Hindu. This realisation would have struck him with greater 
acuity in a cultural environment that was already under some interpretative 
stress. In colonial India, Hindus had been increasingly forced to acknowl-
edge that a homogenised identity, based on some social consensus was piv-
otal to any progressive transformation of the self and society. At the time, 
new instruments of bureaucratic control such as the census clearly favoured 
aggregation and vastly exaggerated the value of numbers. And yet, the term 
“Hindu”, as we know, was also quite often a residual category that included 
peoples who could not for some reason call themselves non-Hindu. I im-
agine that given the circumstances, the determination of “Hindu-ness” as-
sumed an importance comparable to that associated with the assessment 
of numerical strength. Evidently, it was no longer enough to assume that 
there was a community that could call itself “Hindu”; the Hindu had also to 
be sufficiently aware of just what supported this self-description.
The use of the label ‘Hindu’, as I have hinted above, was not always flatter-
ing. Among other things, it historicized social and religious labels whereas 
what ‘reformed’ Hindus now needed more urgently was a ‘past’ as different 
from mere history, a trope that flattened time and created romantic visions 
of a flowing, uninterrupted continuum. It was hence that the colonized 
Hindu was pushed to place ‘religion’ before society as the site for all so-
cial change. There was something visibly contingent about society, framed 
as it was by time and space; by comparison, the building blocks for reli-
gion were seen to lie outside recorded history and in timeless values. “We 
are asked what good is your religion to your society”, Swami Vivekananda 
(1863‒1902) once complained. “Society is made the test of truth. Now this 
is very illogical. Society is only a stage in the growth which we are passing 
[through]. Society is good at a certain stage but it cannot be an ideal, it is 
South Asia Institute
Papers
Issue 1 2015
South Asia Institute
www.sai.uni-heidelberg.de
Amiya P. Sen: “Hinduism” and the Problem of Self-Actualisation in 
the Colonial Era: Critical Reflections
12
constant flux”.24 Understandably, this ‘religion’ also came to be associated 
more with principles than personalities, a strategy that helped it appear 
more rational and universal. Whereas in the 1880s, Bankim Chandra had 
taken some pains to project Krishna as a historical personality,25 some Hin-
dus hereafter were never weary of arguing that the enduring quality about 
“Hinduism” lay precisely in the fact that it had no historically established 
founder.26 At a public lecture organized by some Hindu reformists at Bom-
bay, G.Y. Chitnis, a spokesperson for the Brahmo Samaj, was persuaded to 
speak of the ‘great danger’ into which all historical religions fell. “They seek 
to avoid the danger either by adapting their creeds to the need of the time 
spirit or by making historical criticism subservient to their particular theo-
logical bias”, Chitnis warned. “In both cases, there is violence done either 
to religion or to historical criticism”.27 Quite clearly, such an argument was 
fraught with immense strategic value. It encouraged the turning back on the 
relativism of newly emerging disciplines like history and anthropology, the 
questioning of religions that claimed to have been founded on historically 
unique revelations and the rejection of utilitarian perspectives by which re-
ligions in India particularly had come to be judged. In hindsight, this also 
explains the recurring attempt within the colonial Hindu discourse (down to 
the days of Gandhi) to fall back on the older but consciously de-historicized 
term, sanātan, literally meaning that which was ageless and eternal.28 This 
move clearly carried great strategic value. It supported the proposition that 
the ‘purity’ or the ‘authenticity’ of a tradition could be best judged in terms 
24 Cited in Sen, ‘The Idea of Social Reform’, p. 130.
25 In his magnum opus, Kr̥ṣṇacaritra (1886). The original Bengali treatise is reproduced 
in Bāgal: Baṅkim Racanābalī, vol. 2, 407‒583.
26 Commenting on the historicity of Krishna and of the Bhagavadgītā, Vivekananda ob-
served: “[…] there is no connection between the historical researches and our real aim, 
even if the historicity of the whole thing is proved to be absolutely false today, it will not 
in the least be any less true”. (Swami Vivekananda (1978): ‘Thoughts on the Gita’; in: The 
Complete Works of Swami Vivekananda, vol. 4; Calcutta, Advaita Ashrama; pp. 103, 105.
27 Chitnis G.Y. (1927): ‘The Faith of the Brahma Samaj’; in: Chitnis, G.Y. (ed.) Freedom, 
Religion and Reality. Essays on Liberal Religious Thought; Bombay, Y.V. Bhandarkar; 65‒6.
28 For an apt example, cf. Sri Aurobindo (1950): Uttarpara Speech; Pondicherry, Sri Au-
robindo Ashram. (This was first published in 1909 in the journal Karmayogin.)
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of antiquity and certain given values and not necessarily, the historical past. 
Here, the trope of degenerative time, common to both Anglican Protestant-
ism and Brahmanical Hinduism, also forced ‘reform’ to speak in the lan-
guage of a ‘revival’.
The colonial Hindu apologetic took birth in a self-reflexivity that had to 
negotiate some confounding characterisations of “Hindu” and “Hinduism”, 
originating in the West but subsequently also advanced by Indian critics. In 
the historiography of nineteenth century India, a ‘unified’ Hinduism is shown 
to be the work of Anglophone neo-Hindus who, allegedly, employed gross 
cultural essentialisations in order to establish the credentials of Hinduism as 
a distinctly identifiable religion. According to the Indologist Paul Hacker, the 
term ‘neo-Hindu’ was first used by Rev. Robert Antoine in 1953 to describe 
the new discourse that was brought into play in late nineteenth century 
India.29 However, the use of the term nabya hindu (neo-Hindu) as evident 
in colonial Bengal, has an older history30 and reportedly, some English-edu-
cated Hindus themselves often used it in a derogatory sense.31 In the case 
of Bankim himself who is known to have used it, the term proved pivotal to 
a polemical debate that occurred between the more traditionalist elements 
within the community of anglicized Hindus and those who employed great-
er hermeneutical freedom. From a scrutiny of an essay by Bankim Chandra 
titled ‘Ādi brāhmo samāj o nabya hindu sampradāẏ’ (The Adi Brahmo Samaj 
and the community of Neo-Hindus) it emerges that Bankim Chandra tried 
to defend himself against criticism from Dvijendranath and Rabindranath 
Tagore (both of whom were then associated with the conservative wing of 
the Brahmos, the Adi Brahmo Samaj), accusing men like Bankim Chandra, 
who they counted among ‘neo-Hindus’, of rather spurious re-interpreta-
tions of traditional Hindu notions of moral and religious ‘truth’. 32 Now if 
30 I owe this point to Prof. Hans Harder of the South Asia Institute, Heidelberg, who 
kindly agreed to read an earlier draft of this paper.
31 Harder, Hans (2001): Bankimchandra Chattopadhyay’s Śrīmadbhagabadgītā. Trans-
lation and Analysis; Delhi, Manohar; pp. 240‒1.
32 The debate, interestingly, was over the question of whether the Hindu tradition al-
lowed temporary lapses into untruthfulness for the sake of greater public good. Bankim, 
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the use of this expression in relation to Bankim and like-minded writers was 
indeed derogatory, this probably also points to its ineptness, even in the 
eyes of some contemporary Hindus. To the Tagores, apparently, the ‘nabya 
hindu’ represented a new-fangled Hinduism that had no roots in tradition. 
My own argument though also strives to proceed in other directions. Argu-
ably, the term ‘neo-Hinduism’ clearly postulates a “Hinduism” both earlier 
fixed in time and as a finished product. This, as I shall presently argue, could 
not have been readily accepted by the Anglophone Hindu himself who saw 
Hinduism as essentially evolving over time. From this perspective, ‘nabya 
hindu’ as a term of self-description for men such as Bankim appears to have 
been problematic. How confounding this flaw was is something that I hope 
to demonstrate in the course of this talk and in relation to Bankim Chandra 
himself. Further, if, as argued by some critics, the expression ‘neo-Hinduism’ 
is validated by formative influences originating outside the religion of the 
Hindus, as for instance by the Christian West, one may justifiably ask why 
the term could not be used in other instances when non-Hindu influences 
are known to have significantly shaped Hindu thought. Thus, if Paul Hacker 
is right in labelling colonial Hinduism as ‘neo-Hinduism’ purely on account 
of influences derived from Christian thought,33 it should be equally possible 
for us to call the Ādi Śaṅkara, who borrowed elements from contemporary 
Buddhist philosophy, a neo-Hindu and not a crypto Buddhist (prachanna 
baudha) as commonly done. Not to argue thus would be tantamount to 
suggesting that only modernity and the Christian West had the capacity to 
produce something ‘new’ in the realm of Hindu thought. 
This could be problematic on yet another level. At times, Hindus in colo-
nial India appear quite oblivious (perhaps deliberately so) of mental and so-
cial changes produced by their intellectual engagement with the West. Even 
when deeply influenced by European and Christian categories of thought 
and sometimes departing radically from him in interpreting the philosophi-
adopting a more utilitarian position, thought that it did. This was fiercely contested by 
the Tagores. See Bankim Chandra Chattopdhyay (1973): ‘Ādi brāhmo samāj o nabya hindu 
sampradāẏ’, reproduced in Bāgal, Baṅkim racanābalī, vol. 2.; Kalikātā, Sāhitya Saṃsad, 
913‒9.
33 Ibid.
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cal school of Vedanta, both Rammohan Roy and Vivekananda nevertheless 
chose to situate themselves in the spiritual lineage (guruparamparā) of 
Śaṅkara.34 Here, it would be equally important to remember that the often 
acclaimed ‘progressive’ content of the social and political discourse coming 
from the West was at times blunted by Hindus themselves by putting this to 
conservative uses. Thus, August Comte’s general discouragement of second 
marriages in men was used by a section of educated Hindus to strengthen 
the argument against widow marriages.35 Bankim himself, though inspired 
to experiment with the Positivist philosophy of Comte for a time, ultimately 
gave it up on account of its ‘atheism’.
II
I next turn to the inner inconsistencies within the post-modernist, post-co-
lonialist discourse that has been otherwise so active in challenging the idea 
of “Hinduism” as a given category. It occurs to me that while on one level, 
Edward Said’s Orientalism (1978) has deepened our convictions about the 
ways in which religious traditions outside Europe have been read and dis-
cursively formulated by the West, this work has also produced in its wake, 
certain conceptual and methodological problems of understanding. For one, 
the Saidian view appears to deny the Orientals themselves agency and au-
tonomy: the will or capacity to constructively fashion their own cultures or 
religions outside the framework of producing merely reactionary impulses.36 
Ironically, this comes disconcertingly close to the experience of colonialism 
itself which Said so ably critiques and which also committed moral violence 
by taking away from the colonized peoples, the cultural legitimacy of their 
own experiences.37 On the academic level alone, the Saidian discourse on 
Orientalism is guilty of at least two kinds of misreading: first, it tends to rule 
out plain intellectual and cultural curiosity on the part of Orientalist scholars 
34 Sen, ‘The Idea of Social Reform’, p. 118.
35 Ibid., p. 117.
36 Smith, Questioning Authority, p. 121.
37 Balgangadhara, Reconceptualizing India Studies, p. 111.
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themselves. This curiosity may not have been culturally neutral or innocent 
and yet I feel that these fell short of those manipulative machinations that 
are taken to lie at the heart of all Occidental readings of the Orient. Second, 
it discourages, at least tacitly, the study of the pre-modern pasts and of 
underlying continuities in thought and practice. Had Anglophone Hindus of 
the colonial era also been captivated by the Saidian view, they might have 
found themselves in a curious predicament. If, for instance, they took the 
‘modern’ to have been derived only through the ‘othering’ of ‘tradition’, the 
latter might well have appeared unintelligible and culturally useless. If, on 
the other hand, they saw the modern as continuous with tradition, it would 
have made no sense to study it with any seriousness.
One cannot also but notice how a substantial part of the recent West-
ern scholarship on “Hinduism” is devoted to the study of its political face, 
commonly identified as ‘Hindutva’, palpably neglecting the study of Hindu 
ritual or doctrine.38 There is, however, a case for translating the term ‘Hin-
dutva’ as ‘Hindu-ness’ if only because there is an older history to this term 
which does not quite agree with the interpretation that Savarkar later put 
to it.39 In a sense, the reluctance to acknowledge such variations in mean-
ing follows from a discourse that does not acknowledge “Hinduism” as an 
autonomous and unified body of thought and practice and shares the deep 
disquiet about how such acknowledgement may only breed religious intol-
erance and communal passion.40 Evidently, the contemporaneous critique 
38 Important exceptions to this are the Axel Michaels (2004): Hinduism. Past and Pres-
ent; Princeton, Princeton University Press; and Angelika Malinar (2009): Hinduismus. 
Studium Religionen; Göttingen, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht.
39 See for instance, Julius J. Lipner’s handling of this term in ‘Ancient Banyan. An inquiry 
into the meaning of Hinduism’, reproduced in Llewellyn, Defining Hinduism, 30‒47; p. 
32. To the best of my knowledge, the term Hindutva was first used in modern times by 
Bengali literary scholar Chandranath Basu (1892) in the work Hindutva bā hindur prakr̥ta 
itihās (Hindutva or the authentic history of the Hindus); Kalikātā, Gurudās Caṭṭopādhyāẏ.
40 In 1978, while delivering an anniversary lecture on the 150th birth anniversary cel-
ebrations of the noted Indologist, Rajendralal Mitra, the historian Romesh Chandra Ma-
jumdar is known to have said the following: “To speak oneself as Hindu is now looked 
upon as a sign of communalism by the powers that be. Comment is needless on such 
absurdities”. Cf. The Asiatic Society (1978): Rajendralal Mitra. 150th Birth Anniversary 
Celebrations; Calcutta; pp. 10‒1.
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of political “Hinduism” is itself deeply political in nature and reflects cur-
rently fashionable political moods. Underlining such agenda is the deep dis-
trust of meta-narratives and the somewhat romanticized celebration of the 
small and the fragmentary.  Here, “Hinduism” represents the meta-narrative 
that needs to be somehow broken down into discrete and disparate religion 
sensibilities that can live and breed only in an intellectual environment of 
demolished certitudes. From this perspective, granting a collective identity 
for Hindus is not only academically flawed but also fraught with political 
dangers. “Every Hindu decides what is Hinduism”, I have heard one scholar 
say.41
The contemporary politics of identity, one feels, has now put the term 
‘Hindu’ too under some cloud. Thus, a Dalit activist from Tamil Nadu writes 
the following:
The very concept of Hinduism, which took shape in the north, 
only when the Muslim rule was being consolidated […] was never 
known to the Tamils until the period of colonization. […] The “Hin-
du” was thus born just two centuries back; and he is still a colour-
less, odourless and formless illusory artificial constitution.42
Now, the point about “Hinduism” being completely alien and unknown to 
pre-modern Tamil culture stands clearly in contrast to the observations of 
the Protestant missionary B. Ziegenbalg (1682‒1719) who noted how in 
the Tamil region, Saivas and Vaishnavas functioned as sects but also con-
sidered themselves to be a part of a larger religious formation. Reportedly, 
they acknowledged each other but not the Buddhists and Jains. Importantly 
enough, these observations made by Ziegenbalg were based on local Tamil 
sources and not those in pan-Indian Sanskrit which he made no serious ef-
41 Sharma, Jyotirmay (2013): Hindutva. Exploring the Idea of Hindu Nationalism; New 
Delhi, Penguin Books; p. 13.
42 Guna (1984): Asiatic Mode. A Socio Cultural Perspective; Delhi, Bookwell Publica-
tions; pp. 124‒5; cited in Omvedt, Gail (2005): ‘Introduction to Dalit Vision’, reproduced 
in Llewellyn, Defining Hinduism, 167‒170; p. 169.
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fort to learn.43 Given the fact that it had been known to the Zendavesta 
and to the early Persians and Greeks, the claim that the very category of 
the “Hindu” is a pure construct appears to be not only contra-historical but 
also creates a fuzziness with categorisation. Surely, it is one thing to deny 
oneself as a “Hindu” as another Dalit intellectual-activist, Kancha Ilaiah has, 
and quite another to dispute the very category itself.44 On one level, this is 
at best a circular argument, for in the least, the act of disassociating oneself 
with an identity amounts ipso facto to acknowledging its existence. To me 
what looks no less ominous is the irrational and xenophobic reaction that 
attacks on the use of the term Hindu has now produced in people who are 
acutely uncomfortable with its origins in non-Hindu peoples and cultures. 
A work that has recently come to my notice somewhat angrily asserts how 
the use of the term “Hindu” had simply “hijacked our foundations in Vedic 
and Upanishadic religion”.45
Apart from the problematic perceptions that the West carried in respect 
of “Hinduism”, there was also some serious confusion generated internally 
in the Hindu mind. It is in relation to the new mental and moral challenges 
thrown by the West in the nineteenth century that the Hindus most effec-
tively realized that the vitality of their tradition rested as much on their ca-
pacity to meet new challenges as in attempts to perpetuate older beliefs or 
ways of life. This would explain the anxiety to ‘modernise’, but equally, the 
failure to fathom the innately alienating nature of colonial modernity. One 
of the tangible consequences following from this was the growth of a false 
consciousness that predisposed the Hindus to judge indigenous cultural ex-
periences in the light of Western history and categories of thought. Thus, re-
43 See Sweetman, Will (ed.) (2015): Hinduism. Cultural Concepts in Religious Studies, 
vol. 1; London, Routledge, p. 4. I say this also to question the notion that as a pan-Indian 
language used by Hindu elites, Sanskrit often deliberately glosses over social and cultural 
differences.
44 Kancha Ilaiah (1986): Why I am not a Hindu. A Sudra Critique of Hindutva Philosophy, 
Culture and Political Economy; Calcutta, Samya. It is worth noting that in Ilaiah’s percep-
tion, Hindu and Hindutva become synonymous, thereby implying that the ideology of 
Hindutva is a pre-requisite for establishing the Hindu identity.
45 Ghosh, Suresh Chandra (2013): Loss of Our Religious Identity. How the term Hindu 
has Hijacked our Vedic and Upanishadic Religion; New Delhi, Dev Publishers.
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formist Hindus like Narayan Ganesh Chandravarkar (1855‒1923), associated 
with the Indian Social Conference, spoke of “Hindu Protestantism”,46 and as 
is only too well known, western-educated Hindus of nineteenth century Cal-
cutta proudly claimed to have experienced a western style “Renaissance”.47 
While associating “Hinduism” with Indic thought and experiences, colonized 
Hindus also came to believe, no doubt quite mistakenly, that no religion that 
was not universal in nature could endure in time. Evidently, this idea grew 
from their uncritically accepting Enlightenment tropes about linear move-
ments in history, in a development chronology and the common destiny 
of man. This placed on them the additional burden of having to consist-
ently affirm that “Hinduism” was the most tolerant, accommodative and 
hence, also the most universal of religions. I would argue that eventually, 
this forced the colonized Hindu to confront three inter-related problems.
First, it led them to confuse the doctrinal relativism known to the Hindu 
tradition with pluralism taken in the modern sense of the word. Hindu the-
ism repeatedly speaks of adhikāra and of the freedom to choose one’s iṣṭa 
or the favoured deity. On the other hand, neither of these terms was en-
tirely unrelated to the structures of everyday life. The question of adhikāra 
or one’s eligibility to adopt a certain kind of religious life was partly founded 
on one’s jāti standing and by extension, on saṃskāra (predispositions) and 
karmic consequences from some past life. The concept of adhikāra further-
more, was joined to that of bheda or differentiation, the two then being 
read as adhikāra-bheda, a complexly differentiated and hierarchically ar-
ranged system of eligibility and rights. In the understanding of Ramakrish-
na Paramahamsa (1836‒86), a figure that I would readily identify with old 
world “Hinduism”, it was not left to human beings to freely choose a reli-
gious path. On the contrary, varying choices of paths that men were known 
46 Chandravarkar, N.G. (1911): ‘Hindoo Protestantism. Reform, not Revival’; in: Kaikini, 
L.V. (ed.): The Speeches and Writings of Sir Narayen G. Chandravarkar; Bombay, Mano-
ranjak Grantha Prasarak Mandali, 38‒46.
47 For a brilliant critique see Sarkar, Sumit (1975): ‘Rammohun Roy and the break with 
the Past’; in: Joshi, V.C. (ed.): Rammohun Roy and the Modernization of India; Delhi: Vi-
kas, 46‒68; Sarkar, Sumit (1977): ‘The Radicalism of Intellectuals in a Colonial Situation. 
A Case Study of Nineteenth Century Bengal’; in: Calcutta Historical Journal, 2, 61‒77.
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to make in worldly life essentially reflected the intentionality of God. Under-
standably, this view came down heavily on self-righteousness and religious 
dogmatism since religions, in the first place, were seen to be created by 
God, not men. It is interesting to note how Ramakrishna considered ‘tolera-
tion’ to be a terribly condescending word for it led to the indefensible as-
sumption that a certain religion, having appropriated Truth for itself, could 
charitably and good-humouredly let other religions co-exist.48 The choice 
of iṣṭa too, I would further argue, allowed little room for firm theological 
exclusions. To the best of my knowledge, very few Hindu temples, and even 
those dating back to the pre-modern era (when one might allow for greater 
sectarian rivalry) were entirely dedicated to a particular god or goddess to 
the rigid exclusion of others. Thus, the medieval Bhakti saint Tulsidas could 
sing the praise of Lord Rama, even when inhabiting the city of Kashi, tradi-
tionally dedicated to Lord Siva.49
Second, the colonized Hindu was also led to believe that all religions shared 
common aims and porous boundaries which, in turn, allowed a unity of ends 
if not a common religious vocabulary.50 In the nineteenth century, this thesis 
took either the form of an intellectual empathy towards religious cultures 
other than one’s own or else, the synthetic fusion of select ideas or symbols 
borrowed across traditions. In colonial India both these tendencies were 
best exemplified by the Brahmo Samaj51 and both failed to endure, to say 
the least. Contrast this to the eclecticism of the old-world Hindu religious 
figure, Ramakrishna, who did not for a moment believe that boundaries 
48 See the third essay in Sen, Amiya P. (2001): Three Essays on Sri Ramakrishna and His 
Times; Shimla, Indian Institute of Advanced Study.
49 Nicholson, Unifying Hinduism, p. 187. Note also the reversal of this idea in the shrine 
of Rameshwar in South India where Siva is the deity propitiated by Rama.
50 In hindsight, this appears quite facile given the important doctrinal differences that 
exist even within the so called Semitic group of religions, often clubbed together to sug-
gest their distinctiveness as against Indic religions like Buddhism, Hinduism and Jainism.
51 I am referring here to the religious experiments of the Brahmo missionary and theo-
logian, Keshab Chandra Sen (1838‒84) who commissioned the study of the lives of saints 
and prophets from the Hindu, Christian, Buddhist and Islamic traditions. By the early 
1880s, he also put together the Nababidhan (New Dispensation) Church which syntheti-
cally fused ideas and symbols drawn from various religious traditions.
South Asia Institute
Papers
Issue 1 2015
South Asia Institute
www.sai.uni-heidelberg.de
Amiya P. Sen: “Hinduism” and the Problem of Self-Actualisation in 
the Colonial Era: Critical Reflections
21
determined by one religion could be easily breached by another but more 
importantly, that each of these religions had to be understood in terms of 
its own doctrinal orthodoxy or prescribed practices. When training himself 
in the theology of Islam, Ramakrishna scrupulously kept away from the Kali 
temple where he was the officiating priest.52 Ironically, such eclecticism, it 
has to be said, has been seriously misconstrued as Universalism at times by 
none other than monks of the Ramakrishna Order itself. Thus, in an effort 
to propagate what he believed to be the Hindu gift of religious Universalism, 
Swami Lokeshvarananda, a senior monk once associated with the Rama-
krishna Mission Institute of Culture in Kolkata, declared Ramakrishna to be 
an avatāra not only for Hinduism but for Islam and Christianity as well.53 It 
did not occur to him that especially in the context of Islam, this would have 
been sheer blasphemy. Finally, perhaps without their quite realizing it, the 
belief that all religions had common aims and principles though articulated 
in different languages, also made colonial Hindus somewhat defenceless 
against other traditions which claimed Truth for themselves, leaving others 
to suffer damnation. For instance, at least in theory, this would have weak-
ened the Hindu anger at Christian evangelism.
It is not at all improbable that in pre-colonial India too and notwithstand-
ing synthesising tendencies between religions, people were sufficiently 
aware of the doctrinal differences between, say, the pantheistic tenden-
cies known to “Hinduism” and the transcendence of God in Islam. It is curi-
ous too how the medieval poet-theologian, Kabir, acknowledges the sepa-
rate religious communities of ‘Hindus’ and ‘Muslims’ even as he declines to 
identify himself with any of these:
Gorakh! Gorakh! cries the Yogi; Ram! Ram! says the Hindu
‘Allah is One’, proclaims the Muslim, But […] my Lord pervades all.
The God of the Hindus resides in a temple, the God of Muslims
resides in a mosque,
52 See Sen, Three Essays, p. 89‒110.
53 Elst, Koenraad (2002): Who is a Hindu? Revivalist Voices of Animism, Buddhism, Sikh-
ism and other Offshoots of Hinduism; New Delhi, Voice of India; p. 86.
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Who resides there where there are no temples, nor mosques!54
From this I am persuaded to conclude that this is not so much a questioning 
of the labels ‘Hindu’ or ‘Muslim’ per se as cautioning people that these will 
not by themselves, bring them any closer to God.
Third, the colonized Hindu was often confounded when trying to under-
stand the mechanisms of social and cultural change. This is typically exem-
plified by a short passage that I have found among the writings of Bankim 
Chandra: “Let us revere the past”, he says, “but we must, in justice to our 
new life, adopt new methods of interpretation and adapt the old, eternal 
and undying truths to the necessities of that life”.55 What caught my atten-
tion here was Bankim Chandra’s rather unconvincing attempt to simultane-
ously play with the words ‘adopt’ and ‘adapt’. Now if ‘truths’ that Bankim 
speaks of were ‘eternal’ and ‘undying’ in nature, why did these have to be 
adapted at all to a new environment? In this passage, I will argue, one finds 
the ambivalence that typically characterised colonial Hindu thought: the 
tendency to take both a historical and de-historicized view of culture, to 
treat culture as something both frozen in time but also evolving historically. 
Arguably, at a time when the Hindu mind was influenced equally by nostal-
gia and evolutionary views of society and culture,56 this was but natural. I 
also believe that this ambivalence also deflected from the realisation that a 
long and varied past was not always amenable to a strong and continuous 
tradition, for, time could also produce unwanted and traumatic ruptures.
At times, the thought of the colonized Hindus reveals an utter confusion 
of categories. Take for instance the very puzzling dichotomy in Rammohan 
54 Kumar, S. (1984): The Vision of Kabir. Love Poems of a Fifteenth Century Weaver-
Sage; Concord, Alpha & Omega Books; pp. 21, 31. Cited in Lippner, Julius J. (2006): ‘The 
Rise of Hinduism or, How to Invent a World Religion with only Moderate Success’; in: 
International Journal of Hindu Studies, 10.1, 91‒104.
55 Bankim Chandra Chattopadhyay (1990): ‘Letters on Hinduism’; in: Bagal, Jogesh 
Chandra (ed.): Bankim Rachanavali: English Writings. Calcutta: Sahitya Samsad, 227-269; 
236.
56 In the late nineteenth century, the writings of Herbert Spencer cast a major influ-
ence on the Hindu mind besides that of Darwin in accepting an evolutionary view of 
social change.
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Roy who saw religion as the site for all meaningful social change but in sub-
stance also argued against the same idea. In his thinking, the Raja was pro-
gressive but not secular; for him, the choice lay not between the ‘religious’ 
and the ‘secular’ but between pure/authentic and impure/inauthentic reli-
gion itself. This, however, is hard to reconcile with Rammohan Roy’s instru-
mentalist view that religion was expected to secure for man, the bourgeois 
virtues of ‘political advantage and social comfort’.57 “A votary of God obtains 
his desired objects”, the Raja was persuaded to remark, “anyone desiring 
honour and advantage shall revere Him”.58 Here, Rammohan sounds more 
the religious materialist than the spokesperson for transcendental Vedanta 
which he otherwise claimed to be and arguably, the confusion arose in his 
attempt to wed Brahmanical thought to bourgeois values of the contem-
porary West. In a somewhat different form, the same dichotomy appears 
in the Hindu missionary figure, Swami Vivekananda. The Swami angrily dis-
missed the worth of a religion that could not wipe the widow’s tears or 
bring food to the starving and yet believed that all social reform had to be 
founded in the spiritual.59
There are two presumptions common to the recent scholarship on “Hin-
duism” that need careful interrogation. First, there is the tacit belief that 
‘unity’ can be founded on absolute identification alone and not broad affini-
ties. In this view, “Hinduism” cannot claim to be a unified category because 
it appears to speak with many and often mutually conflicting voices. This 
thesis, however, may be at least partly met with the argument that identi-
ties harden mostly when self-definition turns exclusionary. To offer a crude 
analogy, members of the same family do not ordinarily address each other 
by their family names and by extending the same argument it could be said 
that in pre-colonial India, sectarian Shaivas and Vaishnavas may not have 
felt it necessary to additionally identify themselves as “Hindu”. A sense of 
57 Cf. Rammohan’s undated letter to John Digby, reproduced in Ghosh, Ajit Kumar 
(ed.) (1973): Rāmˈmohan racanābalī (The Collected [Bengali] Works of Rammohan Roy); 
Kalˈkātā: Haraph Prakāśanī, p. 462.
58 Cited in Sen, Explorations, p. 29.
59 Sen, Amiya P. (ed.) (2003): Social and Religious Reform. The Hindus of British India, 
New Delhi, Oxford University Press; pp. 12‒13.
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unity can sometimes proceed from discernibly broad overlaps and family-
resemblances. Thus, in 1897, when speaking of ‘common bases of Hindu-
ism’ before an audience assembled at Lahore, Vivekananda hinted not at a 
single doctrinal pivot on which “Hinduism” rested but certain shared ideas 
and values which went into the making of a distinct world-view.60 Second, 
there is the tendency to collapse the possible distinction between a term 
and a concept, an outward projection of the collective self and an inter-
nally generated, broad-based self-understanding. In my own researches on 
‘Reform Hinduism’ I have found, somewhat to my surprise, that words like 
‘saṃskār’ or ‘sudhār’, now commonly taken to mean ‘reform’, were not in 
vogue in the vernaculars of pre-modern north India like Hindi, Marathi or 
Bengali. Are we then to conclude from this that the intention to reform so-
ciety of its social and religious abuses took birth only in modern India? It is 
not the availability or the persistent use of a single term (in this instance, 
‘reform’ or its equivalent in Indian languages) that cogently explains dif-
ferences between the pre-modern conceptualisations of social or religious 
change and the modern. In colonial India, such a term became necessary 
in terms of both strategy and concept since Hindu reformers themselves 
turned acutely self-conscious about the moral worth of human interven-
tion. This, in turn, followed from the idea, increasingly accepted by the colo-
nial Hindu intelligentsia, but absent in dominant versions of Hindu cosmol-
ogy, that the very act of creation and human history were invested with a 
specific purpose and were manifestly anthropocentric. It was the accept-
ance of this view that allowed Reform Hinduism to make fairly rigid distinc-
tions between the ‘good’ and ‘bad’, ‘right’ and ‘wrong’—distinctions that 
could not be as clearly made within Hindu-Brahmanical epistemology and 
metaphysics. Indeed, two of the defining qualities of Hindu thought in the 
nineteenth century were respectively, the tendency to insert moral distinc-
tions within what was otherwise flattened cosmologies and to postulate a 
development chronology that accepted history as the chronicle of uninter-
60 See Swami Vivekananda (1973): ‘The Common Bases of Hinduism’ (Lectures from 
Colombo to Almora); in: The Complete Works of Swami Vivekananda, vol. 3; Calcutta, 
Advaita Ashrama, 366.
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rupted human progress. Both, it would be important to reiterate, palpably 
deviated from the cosmology of traditional Hinduism which did not believe 
either in a unique, history-centred Revelation or the dualist separation be-
tween God and man.
In conclusion, I would hazard the guess that even allowing for the fact 
that religious traditions are by nature hybrid as are races, “Hinduism” is 
perhaps not an entirely amorphous and intractable category. My argument 
here rests not simply upon the fact that even the harshest critics of this term 
have now grudgingly come to accept its wide social currency but equally in 
the hope that rather than be preoccupied by differentiation which has been 
hitherto the case, the future historian of ideas will be willing to investigate 
elements of common-ness, coherence and continuities of thought or prac-
tice within what may be loosely called the ‘Hindu World’. Admittedly, a part 
of what is now seen to constitute “Hinduism” took shape in the past two 
hundred years. On the other hand, to treat this “Hinduism” as entirely con-
tingent and simply reactive in its growth and development is to take a rather 
myopic view of history. For me, it appears possible to qualify Paul Hacker’s 
allegations about colonial “Hinduism” being so grossly ‘inclusive’ in nature 
in at least two ways. In the first place, such inclusivism was not unknown to 
pre-colonial India. But more importantly, Hacker’s thesis resonates with the 
idea that ‘inclusivism’ is by its very nature manipulative appropriation and 
not a sign of growth. No religious culture has consistently resisted change, 
whether generated by genuine self-reflection and a momentum developed 
on its own or else triggered off by ideas or practices produced outside itself. 
It is equally the case that values and ideas originating in one culture cannot 
acquire a potency or meaning in another without there being some possible 
correspondence in thought or behaviour between those cultures. Such cor-
respondence, it needs to be added, is not in every case purely contingent 
or reactive. Rather, it could also represent fortuitous self-discovery, the mir-
roring of ideas partly hidden to oneself but amply visible in the otherwise 
alienating ‘other’.
Historically speaking, Hindus did attempt to define themselves, especially 
at such conjunctures when such definitions became culturally necessary. 
On the whole though, this occurred on two levels, the endogamous and 
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the exogamous, and with varying depth or intensity. Notwithstanding acute 
religious and philosophical differences existing between them, Hindus were 
constantly in conversation with Jains and Buddhists. By comparison, this 
does not appear to have equally occurred in the case of Muslims, partly 
because each of these communities understood Truth differently, both in 
a metaphysical sense and the moral. Arguably, for Hindus who took the 
“Hindu” identity to be essentially founded on birth and did not seek formal 
conversion from communities located outside, it was relatively easier to ac-
knowledge that Truth could equally lie beyond their own religious domain. 
Here, it might be also appropriate to recall the tendency among Hindus to 
see Truth to be intrinsically indeterminate. In Eknath’s Hindū tark saṃvād, 
for instance, the Hindu protagonist wonders why, given God’s omnipotence, 
it was not possible for Him to be equally manifest in the image.61
In the Hindu view, as I have come to understand it, the Absolute Reality 
is the ground for all possibilities. From this perspective, no expression of 
the finite can exhaust the Infinite. While man and this phenomenal world 
are It’s concrete manifestations, the Absolute Itself transcends and goes 
beyond both the finite and infinite, the personal and the impersonal. This 
might explain why, alongside its doctrinal latitude, the Hindu tradition has 
also assumed an unassailable unity (ekavākyatā) inherent in all Hindu scrip-
tures. “[…] the explanation of the Veda and of its commentators must either 
be admitted as sufficiently reconciling the apparent contradictions or must 
not be admitted (at all)”, Rammohan Roy observed in his A Defence of Hin-
doo Theism, “in the latter case, the Veda must be necessarily supposed to 
be inconsistent with itself and therefore altogether unintelligible, which is 
directly contrary to the faith of the Hindu of every description”.62
In the nineteenth century, even as they laboured to formulate a Universal 
religion, the Hindu intelligentsia was also inclined to believe that moralism 
was more amenable to universality than religious belief. For one, this could 
be associated with greater cultural non-aggression. Whereas theologies in-
sisted on a certain view of man’s relationship with God, a moral view of the 
61 Nicholson, Unifying Hinduism, p. 193.
62 Cited in Sen, Explorations, p. 25.
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world could deftly bypass that. This would explain the Hindu penchant for 
separating the moral teachings of Christ from the purely theological postu-
lates about his divinity, much to the annoyance of European missionaries. 
Evidently, religious re-orientation implied a greater cultural uprooting than 
the acceptance of morally sound behaviour. “[…] If religion consists of the 
blessings of self-knowledge and improved notions of God and a system of 
morality held a subordinate place, I certainly prefer the Vedas,” Rammo-
han Roy once wrote to his friend, Chandrashekhar Deb.63 It is equally pos-
sible, however, that the Hindu ultimately made no rigid distinction between 
the moral and the spiritual. In 1926 (on another authority, 1929),64 Gandhi 
turned around the expression ‘God is Truth’ to read ‘Truth is God’ and this, 
notwithstanding the fact that he remained a deeply pious Hindu. In this 
view, evidently, moral correctness too ultimately converged in the highest 
spiritual life.
My concluding thought for the day is that “Hinduism”, like all other religions, 
remains deeply aspirational. At heart, it represents an abiding quest for 
Truth and not simply indeterminacy or epistemological relativism. Perhaps 
it is the case that Hindu India and the Christian West have not fully under-
stood each other since they have also worked with palpably different ideals. 
While one of these has always postulated a Unity from which proceeded dif-
ferentiation, the other has striven to find some unity underlying disparate 
phenomenal experiences. In one, doctrinal allegiance seeks to bind man to 
God, in the other, salvation is essentially founded in individualized and in-
tuitive experiences. One of these has consistently striven for perfection, the 
other for ‘pūrṇatva’ or fullsomeness.65 Permit me then, to end with another 
quote from Bankim Chandra:
63 Ibid., p. 32.
64 Margaret Chatterjee believes that the change took place in 1929, Bhikhu Parekh, in 
1926.
65 As found in the invocation common to some major Upaniṣads. A good example oc-
curs in the opening lines of the Br̥hadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad. The word ‘pūrṇa’, however, 
has sometimes been rendered as ‘infinity’, without significantly altering the meaning. A 
typical instance of the latter occurs in the edition published by the Ramakrishna Math. 
See anon. (1951): The Brihadaranyaka Upanishad. Mylapore, Sri Ramakrishna Math.
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With other peoples, religion is only a part of life; there are things 
religious and there are things lay and secular. To the European, 
his relations to God and to the spiritual world are things sharp-
ly distinguished from his relations to man and to the temporal 
world. To the Hindu, his relations to God and his relations to man 
are incapable of being so distinguished. They form one compact 
and harmonious whole. […] All life to him (the Hindu) was religion 
and never received a name from him, because it never had for 
him an existence apart from all that had received a name.66
Here, it is quite probable that his polemical intent led Bankim Chandra to 
overstretch the differences between the Christian West and Hindu India. 
He would have been far more accurate if only he had chosen to replace 
the word ‘religion’ with what a recent work has identified as ‘Dharmic Con-
sciousness’.67 On the other hand, one ought not to forget that for reasons 
rooted in his historical situation, Bankim Chandra had already been forced 
to somewhat dubiously translate dharma as religion.68 From that commit-
ment, there was perhaps no going back. I have no reason otherwise to doubt 
that Bankim was aware of manifest differences between the Hindu world-
view and that of the West and of the ways in which these vitally shaped the 
two cultures.
66 Bankim Chandra Chattopadhyay (2011): ‘Letters on Hinduism’. Reprinted in: Sen, 
Amiya P. (ed.): Bankim’s Hinduism. An Anthology of Writings by Bankim Chandra Chat-
topadhyay. Delhi, Permanent Black, p. 299.
67 Rajiv Malhotra (2011): Being Different. An Indian Challenge to Western Universalism; 
New Delhi, Harper Collins & The India Today Group. Sri Aurobindo, in what was perhaps 
a polite corrective to what Bankim had written, observed the following: “Perhaps there 
was too much religion in one sense; the word is English, smacks too much of things ex-
ternal […] [and] there is no one Indian equivalent. But if we give rather to religion the 
sense of the following of the spiritual impulse in its fullness and define spirituality as the 
attempt to know and live in the highest self, the divine and all-embracing unity and to 
raise life in all its parts to the divinest possible values, then it is evident that here was not 
too much of religion but too little of it […]” (emphasis mine) (Sri Aurobindo, The Renais-
sance in India, p. 75).
68 As in his Dharmmatattva, see note 20 above.
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Post Script: In the course of preparing this presentation I have been increas-
ingly seized by the apprehension that my recurring use of words or expres-
sions like ‘Hindu’ or the ‘Hindu mind’ or ‘Hindu hermeneutics’ will be read 
as gross and indefensible essentialisation. However, this is not so much a 
conceptual problem as stylistic. It is a problem that appears to have also 
confronted others. Prima facie, is it not the case that A.K. Ramanujan’s sem-
inal essay ‘Is there an Indian Way of Thinking? An Informal Essay’ conflates 
the Hindu with the Indian?69 Even so, I have reason to believe that he was 
not essentialising. This is also a paper that I have consciously and conscien-
tiously distanced from political readings of religion and culture. I am given 
to understand that in the contemporary world, everything is pervasively 
political. However, even when accused of naïveté, I would prefer to think 
otherwise.
69 Ramanujan, A.K. (1989): ‘Is there an Indian Way of Thinking? An Informal Essay’; 
Contributions to Indian Sociology 23.1, 41‒58.
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